A

LIVERYMAN'S REPLY TO Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne's* ADDRESS.

Shewing that GENTLEMAN's

Real MOTIVES,

AND HIS

Whole CONDUCT,

CONCERNING

Canning and *Squires.*

13

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ADVERTISEMENT.

TO thoſe who have objected to the Stile of my Pamphlet, I think proper to anſwer, I am no AUTHOR. I am a *Liveryman*. I wiſh I could have done it better.

A

LIVERYMAN's

REPLY, &c.

THERE is an old Proverb, Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*, that ſays, *A fool's bolt is ſoon ſhot*. I beg pardon for not ſaying firſt I meant it of myſelf; but they won't miſtake: *Your Thunder-bolt* has been long enough in coming.

It is a very civil Addreſs! and you are a very civil knight, as ever the ſword royal fell upon! it is a very *ſingular* honour you have been pleaſed to confer upon us; we ſhall ever retain of it the moſt grateful remembrance: and I cannot think, but ſo dutiful an Addreſs merits a moſt gracious Anſwer.

You owed it as a duty to *us*, becauſe *we* were your Conſtituents; and you were reſolved to do it becauſe it was your duty! *that* was your *motive*, that was your *real* motive, and that was your *only* motive! — no man alive will doubt you.

If any Lord Mayor was ever conſtituted by the Livery before, to be ſure he has done juſt the ſame; becauſe it was his duty too! — but I forget. All Lord Mayors of *London* are not Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*'s! it is not every ſupreme magiſtrate that can tranſport a *Bet Canning*, or kill a *Wat Tyler*.

Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*, glorious Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*, immortal Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*, was at firſt the patron of injur'd innocence, and now he is the vindicator of the City's honour: he had then no other motive to take the part of the poor Gipſey; he has now no other view in vindicating of his conduct. Who ever thought he had! no man in the World can think it. — A *Daniel* come to *Judgment!* yea a *Daniel*.

Great Sir, we reverence your efforts; the City of *London* is obliged to you; the laws of *England* thank you: you have ſupported the honour of the one, you have preſerved the innocence of the other; which elſe would have been made murtherers: and you are worthy to grace a higher ſign at *Wallworth*.

So

So long as diſintereſted virtue ſhall have praiſe, the name of that Lord Mayor of *London* ſhall be had in remembrance, who took the part of an innocent Gipſey, againſt the ſentence of that Court where he preſided; ſeeking no popularity, nor remembring the approach of an Election!

Theſe, Sir, being my ſentiments, how could I be longer ſilent!

It is with pleaſure I hear all men, ſince this great publication, ſpeak of you as they ought: for I love every man ſhould have his due.

It is a tranſport to me to read the effects of it in the Publick Papers. I forget what was that man's name who ſet the church on fire, that people might have ſomething to ſay about him. *It is a good thing*, ſays he, *to be talked of any way.*

I rejoice to read of thoſe * *many worthy Gentlemen that had been miſled by their compaſſion, or had been impoſed upon by the artifices of deſigning men; but are convinced by your Addreſs of* CANNING'S IMPOSTURE.

Only one thing vexes and ſuprizes me: I never found one of theſe convinced Gentlemen *out of the News Papers.*

All unprejudiced people that I ever met with, have thought of *Canning* alike, and I find them think juſt the ſame now as they us'd to do. All but one ſet of people are a-

* See the News Papers of the 17th of July inſtant.

greed

greed what they ſhould think of *her*: but perhaps you'll aſk me by this time what I think of *you*. Upon my credit I think you to be, what the poet calls *, *the nobleſt work of God*: that is my ſerious opinion of the right worſhipful Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*.

You'll aſk me if I don't think you diſintereſted? without doubt! impartial? O! for a certainty! a worthy magiſtrate? *indeed I do*.

Come, I'll tell you what I think of you; I think you to be a very honeſt man, who would do a very honeſt thing, to ſerve a very honeſt purpoſe; and when you had done it, would make the moſt of it. But don't want me to go any farther! you'll ſtrain the ſtring 'till it breaks: they won't think ſo well of you as they ought.

You are a very generous man, Sir *Criſp!* that all muſt allow, by your pamphlet; for you there do a great deal more than you promiſed: and who would not wiſh to crown the robe of juſtice with the wreath of generoſity!

When liberality ceaſes to be the enſign of juſtice, it will ceaſe to be the enſign of honour †.

You promiſed us only an account of your conduct; but you have added *what ought to be our judgment upon it*. You promiſed us no more than facts; but you have added to the plums of truth, the paper and packthread

* An honeſt man's the nobleſt work of God. POPE.

† Addreſs, Page 19.

of

of reaſonings. You promiſed only to ſtate caſes; but you have drawn concluſions.

How much are we obliged to you! it is therefore I am thus early to pay my gratitude; we might have miſtaken many parts of your conduct, if you had not been pleaſed to mark out its candour and ingenuity. We might have thought you officious in this place, and raſh in another: in this inſtance too remiſs, and in another precipitate. How obliged are we to you for theſe aſſiſtances to our judgment; it was kind to help a ſet of poor ignorant mechanicks, ſuch as ſome of us I am afraid are; and, honourable Sir, we thank you.

I thank you for one, and I do it moſt devoutly; for I am very ſenſible that I ſhould never have thought of your conduct in the manner you tell me I ſhould, in ſome inſtances, if you had not directed me this way by your reaſonings.

If you had given us nothing but the facts, even as you have yourſelf related them, we ſhould never have judged as you intended in all reſpects; and then no mortal creature would have got any thing by the pamphlet but Mr. Deputy *Hodges*.

You told us, you would only ſtate the facts, and leave us to judge of your conduct: that was to be *our* buſineſs; but you have taken the trouble off our hands intirely.

There's a ſtory in *Joe Miller's* jeſts, of a lady that turned away her woman for being too

too great with her huſband: huſſey, ſays ſhe, I took you to do your buſineſs, not mine; and ſo ſent her a-packing.

I only tell you a good ſtory, Sir *Criſp*, I hope no body will make applications.

It might be dangerous to have left us to ourſelves, for who knows but *we* might have made quite different obſervations.

I ſay nothing to your ſtile, tho' ſome of our ward call you the *Barking Orator*. There were cooks enough in that kitchen to have ſpoiled a ſea of pottage.

We ſhall ſee hereafter whether we cannot diſtinguiſh, in the ſeveral parts of it, the energy of the *Bar-advocate*, the argumentation of the *Robin-Hood-orator*, and the keenneſs of the *Aldermanbury-ſolicitor*; all engrafted upon the pompous declamation of *Hart-ſtreet*.

You are found, O moſt candid addreſſer of the Livery! I know where to ferret out every hair of the dull rabbit ſkin, that would be forc'd upon the world for Ermin. I have not been myſelf in the oven for nothing.

I know where to look for the added force, or the added ſmartneſs; as well as if I had ſeen the blot; the pin'd on paper; or the interlineation. I can ſee where the additional ſpirit pops up its little head, and ſtares at us: I can diſtinguiſh where it *pleads*, and where it *ſquabbles*, out of time, and out of tune; and I can ſee where it would cut if it had an edge.

I can

I can diſtinguiſh every patch of tiſſue that is ſtuck upon the flowing robe: and for the ground-work itſelf, I have not read ſo many reams of ſounding nothing, without being able to find to whom that belongs, in ſpite of ten tranſcribers.

Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*, to give you an addreſs, for your addreſs, I know you as well as you know yourſelf: and I will lay you as naked before all the world, as if you had diſcloſed your heart without reſerve or favour.

You have been a judicious magiſtrate: an upright man: this is your character, and be content with it: let's hear no more of this heroic virtue.

Your own heart perfectly approves of your whole conduct. Well ſaid! you are in the temple: *we* ſhould have judged whether a good heart *ought* to have approved it. Remember, Sir, the *publican* went home in better caſe, who ſaid, *God be merciful to me a ſinner.*

He who appeals to the public, puts himſelf upon a trial by his country. We have no proof of this: we admit no man to be evidence in his own cauſe. This ſtands for nothing.

You were generous not to publiſh the work while the trial of *Canning* was depending, becauſe *you knew* the weight your juſtification muſt have againſt her. You judge of your pamphlet as you ſpeak of your heart, modeſt Sir

Criſp Gaſcoigne! there are thoſe who ſay *hang choice* if you aſk them when it ſhould have been printed.

But, Sir, if we give you all the weight, your mighty importance is pleaſed to allow itſelf, how does your great candour and great impartiality appear?

You would not publiſh this formidable juſtification while *Canning* was to come to her trial; but your great humanity brings it forth now; juſt when ſhe is under the double weight of ſickneſs and a ſentence: juſt when the court of aldermen were deliberating upon an act of clemency to her; and which they have now propoſed and carried, Sir, in ſpite of this oppoſition, and all others.

You are very ready to aſk queſtions, but you anſwer them yourſelf! if you will aſk me what you ſhould have done on this occaſion, I ſhall tell you. Your humanity ſhould have kept it back till ſhe was ſhipped off. There is no election coming on now: it would have been time enough when ſhe was gone, to have juſtified your character.

I love conſiſtency in men's actions, becauſe I love truth. If it was your humanity that occaſioned your delaying it hitherto, your humanity ſhould have delayed it ſtill. If there was any other reaſon, I don't aſk you to tell it; but what harm would it have done you to be ſilent.

You are very civil to Mr. *Roberts* * and *Co.* where you ſay they atteſted things under their own hands, when they knew nothing of the matter! it ſhews well in an Addreſs to the Livery of *London:* and they know how to thank you.

I am got, Sir, to your fourth page; for I conſider you methodically: and here I find a copy of a letter from Mr. *Ford.*

I hope it is an exact copy: the original may be come at. Will Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne* warrant that it is an exact copy! doubtleſs he will, or he would never have put it into his Addreſs to the Livery of *London.*

Of this a Liveryman and you may poſſibly ſpeak more hereafter. Not that I ſuppoſe there is any material difference; that cannot be imagined; but when a copy is given, I would have a ſtrict and exact copy: this we may talk of when they have been compared.

In the mean time, the letter puts ſo many odd things into my head, that I cannot help aſking you two or three queſtions.

I obſerve, Sir, that this letter is written in the ſame particular manner, with your Addreſs, and that is a very peculiar one: in the ſame ſtile, and in the ſame quick, ſhort, ſnip-ſnap paragraphs.

The parſon of *Abbotſbury*, and the under-ſheriff of *Dorſetſhire*, whoſe letters you have

* Addreſs, Page 3.

 inſerted

inſerted alſo, write in one plain and continued way, like other people.

In *Abbotſbury* and at *Dorſetſhire* they write as they do in other places; but at *Barking* they write as they do no where but in *Aldermanbury*; and in *Aldermanbury* they write as they do no where in the world but at *Barking*.

I want to know, Sir, how theſe two ſeveral ſtiles, ſo very peculiar, come to agree with one another.

In plain *Engliſh*, Can a man be anſwered which of theſe three things is the cauſe? Did Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne* write Mr. *Ford*'s letter? Or did Mr. *Ford* write Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*'s Addreſs to the Livery of *London*? Or did ſomebody elſe write both of them?

You'll pardon me, Sir: but in publiſhing your Addreſs, you invite a publick Reply. Which of theſe three things was true? Or was ne'er a one of them?

There is one thing more theſe letters put me in mind of, and it muſt out: theſe letters are troubleſome things, they will remain for ever.

The vicar of *Abbotſbury*'s letter to Mr. *Ford* is dated the fifth of *March*; and there is another letter from the ſame gentleman, directed to Mr. *Bun*, dated the twenty eighth of *February*.

Take care, Sir, that we don't, by the date of this letter, and by your own acknowledgment, take from you the whole merit of this great atchievement.

If you ſhould not prove, upon enquiry, to be the original diſcoverer of the Gipſey's innocence, we are to look ſomewhere elſe for the firſt patrons of publick juſtice, and vindicators of the laws of our country.

I ſuppoſe the letter was wrote firſt that got the firſt anſwer: and if ſo, What is the conſequence?

If Mr. *Bun* firſt wrote to *Abbotſbury* for proof of the Gipſey's being there; and if juſtice *Lediard* firſt argued *Virtue Hall* into the deſign of a Recantation; I want to know, what it was that Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne* diſcovered in this mighty affair. I ſay what he diſcovered; for every body knows how he acted upon the diſcovery.

As to Mr. *Bun*, it is very well known judge *Gundry* deſired, or, if you pleaſe, *directed* him to write; and you ſay yourſelf, you did not know ſo much as where *Virtue Hall* was, till doctor *Hill*, WHOM YOU NEVER SAW BEFORE, told you.

You aſk us, Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*, what effect theſe letters of the parſon and the ſheriff, and the certificates of the alehouſe-man and farrier, would have had upon us! here you are right; this queſtion throws your undeaſtanding, as well as your integrity, upon the proper juſtification.

We are a ſet of plain men, and theſe things would have had the effect on us they ought. I thank you for aſking us the queſtion; but I don't

I don't thank you for anſwering it yourſelf. Sir, permit me to ſay you are too forward.

This is Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*'s Addreſs to himſelf; not to the Livery of *London*.

But to ſtick to the queſtion: for as you aſk it, I ſhall give you one more anſwer. The queſtion is not unneceſſary; *nor were the effects it would have had on us the ſame it appears to have had on you.*

It would have convinced *us* of the Gipſey's *innocence*, provided *Abbotſbury* was ſo righteous a town, that ſix rogues could not be found in it: but it convinced *you* of *Canning's guilt* at all adventures.

Theſe are two diſtinct things, though you are pleaſed to confound them; the Gipſey may have been at *Abbotſbury*; and yet *Canning* might have been robb'd at *Enfield*.

If a terrify'd girl, ſcarce recover'd from a fit, and half in the dark, miſtook the face of a perſon, who had treated her with the moſt horrible barbarity; was that a reaſon why ſhe ſhould be proſecuted as a criminal!

Was that to be, to Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*, who took the part of an old woman of an infamous profeſſion, out of the very overflowings of humanity, a reaſon why the other ſhould be treated as an impoſtreſs. 'Tis a coarſe word, but permit me to ſay, Fie!

The

The idenity of the Gipſey was neceſſary to be proved, for another Gipſey might have been the Perſon at *Abbotſbury*. If another, ſhe ought not to eſcape puniſhment; if herſelf, humanity and juſtice plead that ſhe ſhould not ſuffer.

You aſk at whoſe expence this was to be done: and this, Sir, is another of the queſtions I ſhall anſwer. It was to be done at the expence of the City of *London*: not at your's, Sir, nor at any private perſon's whatſoever.

The City, Sir, was concerned in this, not you, any more than as one of its officers; and it is not decent in you, permit me to tell you ſo, to make this boaſt about it.

The tranſaction is ſcarce yet over, and your modeſty might have permitted you to delay this publication a little longer: at leaſt to delay the boaſt of this expence, till you had ſeen whether the City of *London* choſe to be obliged to one of its officers, for taking the buſineſs of the common purſe upon him.

Sir, an *Addreſs* to us was proper, but it might have been a *private Addreſs*. An *Account* of your conduct might be thought neceſſary; but you ſhould have left to us the determining upon it: for, if I am not miſtaken, 'tis *we*, and not *your own heart*, that ſhould abſolve you.

Your publick Addreſs ſeems levelled not ſo much *for* yourſelf, as *againſt Canning*; your own

own juſtification of your conduct ſeems to ſpeak your doubts as to what we ſhould think of it.

Permit me to tell you, as you once told Mr. *Fielding*; Sir, *the magiſtrate ſhould be of no party*. *Canning*, *under* ſentence, has as much title to your humanity, as the Gipſey. *'Till* ſentenced, ſhe had as much right to your protection.

The friends of *Canning*, you complain, had declined to tell you, where *Virtue Hall* was. If people are to be accuſed, 'tis fit that ſhould be done with candour. I call upon you, Sir, to anſwer, Did you ever aſk them fairly?

Sir, be pleaſed to underſtand this as a demand of theirs, and a demand to which they have a right to expect your anſwer.

They have characters, however you are pleaſed to treat them; and they intend to defend themſelves: they inſiſt therefore upon this charge being made peremptorily.

But to the preſent purpoſe; what matters it, whether they told you where *Virtue* was or not: one would have thought, Sir, you could have found that without aſſiſtance. Was it ſo difficult for a Lord Mayor of *London* to find where a girl was, who was a priſoner; at leaſt, who was in a priſon.

What means had Dr. *Hill*, which Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne* had not? or how could that be ſo difficult to a ſupreme magiſtrate, which that egregious gentlemen, with no power but impudence,

pudence, no authority but an impertinent officiouſneſs, did ſo eaſily!

You will pardon my manner of ſpeaking of him: as I uſe perfect freedom with yourſelf, I ſhall not be under any great reſerve about your miniſters.

It was a great ſuprize to you, that *Canning's* friends came with *Virtue Hall*, when you ſent for her: it was alſo a ſurprize to them, that you, *who told them you would communicate to them every ſtep you took*, did not inform them of your ſending for her.

To me neither one nor t'other is ſurprizing. You did not think proper to tell them what you wanted with her, till you had tried if you could obtain it: they did not chuſe to leave her to you, if they could help it, without being themſelves preſent.

Who could tell but the *authority* of a Lord Mayor might have as much weight as the *threats* of Mr. *Fielding*. You have told us, they *made* her make a recantation of her firſt account given before Mr. *Tyſhmaker*; they did not know but you might make her recant her recantation.

You did get her from them, in ſpite of their caution, and to be ſure, the event falſified their fears! they were no conjurers in this matter!

It needed not have been a ſurprize to you, that they who ſupported her were informed of ſo material a tranſaction as the Lord Mayor

of *London's* ſending for her: nor will it ſurprize any man in the world, but you, that they came with her.

When you examined her publickly, you confeſs ſhe would make no recantation: and you repeat the queſtion, What ſhould we have done?

I have no right to anſwer for more than one; but I ſolemnly aſſure you, for myſelf, I would have ſent her back again.

I would never believe that to be truth, which dar'd not face all the world! what power had *Canning*'s friends over her? were not you there for her protection?

I am no friend to cloſeting: and I muſt tell you, that altho' that * *ſanctifying* gentleman you name was preſent, I ſhould have had ten times the opinion of her recantation, if two things had not happened.

If Dr. *Hill* had had no hand in the perſuading her to make it; and if ſhe had made it publickly, before the world, and before the friends of *Canning*.

Now, Sir, we come to the bed-gown: you have promiſed, or ſome people who pretended to be in your ſecrets, have promiſed for you, that *you would put this bed-gown upon the proper owner* — Do that, and you have proved the guilt, or the innocence of *Canning:* but that is not done in *this* Addreſs: an author is a good trade, witneſs the doctor's chariot: we ſhall have, I ſuppoſe, *another*.

* Addreſs, Page 10.

You

You ſay, the girl told you the bed-gown was her mother's: if this be true, *the girl* has indeed put it upon the right owner; but *not Sir Criſp Gaſcoigne.*

You have no more right to the merit of this, Sir, than of the Recantation of *Virtue Hall*, or of the *Abbotſbury* diſcovery. Plainly, unleſs you can prove Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne* to be judge *Gundry*, juſtice *Lediard*, and *Elizabeth Canning*, Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*, with all this pretence to the diſcovery, has made no part of it.

He has acted as a diligent magiſtrate, in a caſe that came before him; and he deſerves no farther praiſe. The diſcovery of the impoſture, if it be one, belongs to others.

But I have not done with this bed-gown. Sir *Criſp!* 'tis but a tatter'd robe for one who has been a Lord Mayor of *London*; yet I muſt take the liberty for a moment to try how it will fit you.

There are thoſe, I am told, who are ready to atteſt, that the girl did not ſay * *it was her mother's bed-gown*, but that ſhe ſaid *ſhe muſt carry it to her mother's.*

Theſe people had ears, Sir, and I am told they have characters: if they ſhould take it into their heads to ſwear this, what will become of your Addreſs. It would ill become

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* Addreſs, Page 11.

Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*, to tell any thing to the Livery of *London* but truth.

That cauſe which needs *other* ſupport, deſerves *none*.

But ſuppoſe the girl did ſay it was her mother's bed-gown. I ſuppoſe, Sir, it might be underſtood at that time to be her's; for nobody would be likely to claim it: if it was her's, Sir, it was her mother's; for every thing that was this poor girl's was her mother's; and what is to be made of ſuch a confeſſion! if ſhe ſpoke the words, ſhe meant no other. Her friends have done well to adviſe her better ſince: no *Lediards*, you find, Sir, could get her to make any more confeſſions. You ſee how neceſſary a thing is ſilence.

But, Sir, I have not yet done with this ragged article of our enquiry. With what intent was the gown detained? Were any ſteps taken to diſcover whoſe it was? yes. You were in *hopes* the waſherwoman would have proved it to be her mother's. You were in hopes! Sir, What right had you to *hope* about it? it became you to enquire: *hope* ſpeaks paſſions, and a party.

You did cauſe means to be uſed in *Aldermanbury*, to ſee if you could get it own'd; becauſe, if own'd there, it would prove ſhe was not abſent.

It was not own'd, and you muſt permit me to ſay, this is ſome argument that ſhe was elſewhere.

But

But now, Sir, Why did not you cauſe the ſame enquiry to be made at *Enfield*? there are waſherwomen at *Enfield*, as well as in *Aldermanbury*. Why might not they diſcover to whom it belonged, as well as the others?

Perhaps you did not *hope* it ſhould be proved to belong to any body at *Enfield*; becauſe it would have prov'd then, that ſhe was abſent; and that ſhe was there.

I think one enquiry was as neceſſary as another: impartiality, if it had made one, would have made both. Both were not made that I ever heard: one I heard was. What then made that one? for it was not impartiality.

Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*, I am trying your motives by your conduct. God only knows mens hearts; and in the ſearch of truth, I will not believe what any man ſhall ſay of his own, if his actions declare againſt it.

Whoſoever I am, Sir, I reſpect you as much as I ought; I would have the world reſpect you ſo much; but I would not have one man in it reſpect you a jot more.

That you have not been the diſcoverer of the Gipſey's innocence, if ſhe be innocent, is certain; for I have ſhewn who were the diſcoverers. That you have not proved the impoſture of *Canning*, if that be proved, is as certain; for I have ſhewn who did ſo prove it.

Theſe things you did not do: but I would willingly allow what you did. You ventured

your

your own money, becauſe you ſuppos'd it would be return'd to you. In this you acted with great ſpirit and generoſity.

I would fain think, that as you acted the part of a diſcerning magiſtrate through all, ſo in all you acted the part of an impartial one. Sir, it remains upon you to explain this article.

I charge nothing againſt you, for I may be miſinformed. If you cauſed enquiry to be made where a diſcovery would have proved the poor girl's *guilt*, you ought to have cauſed enquiry to be made alſo where a diſcovery would have proved her *innocence*.

Sir, in one word, did you, or did you not, cauſe enquiry to be made at *Enfield?* Was any enquiry made there? Or was there none?

If none, may there not be people at *Enfield* who yet know this bed-gown? May they not yet declare it? May not the diſcovery be yet made? And would it not be proper yet to make it? What if, after all, this girl ſhould be found innocent! She may be innocent, and you (except in this article) not to blame in any thing; and if innocent, ſhe is the moſt injured ſubject in *Great Britain*.

Sir, if no enquiry has been made about the gown at *Enfield*, who knows but the girl's friends may ſay, your detaining it, prevented their proving her innocence.

They may ſay, that you detained it to take away from them that opportunity of proving her

her innocence. This would bear hard upon you.

In all this I ſuppoſe the bed-gown was detained, and that enquiry was made at one place, and not in another. I underſtand the matter ſo; and if in this, or any other circumſtance, I err about facts, you will eaſily anſwer me.

I have no particular knowledge of circumſtances: I hear what is reported, and I ſuppoſe it true. I ſhall be ready to be convinced if I err: for I am impartial.

One thing I think ſhould have been done, and it would have ſhewn impartiality. A Reward ſhould have been offered for any one who would prove to whom the bed-gown belonged, whether to *Wells* or *Canning*.

I would have had it cry'd in both places: you have ſcrupled no expence in other articles, Why, Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*, was not this done?

I think the bed-gown reſts upon your ſhoulders, till you attempt to find out to whom it belonged, by an impartial enquiry.

You have given us ſome evidences, that the Gipſey was not at *Enfield* till long after the time of the *pretended* robbery.

This may be true; and yet the robbery may not be a pretended one: for *Elizabeth Canning* might be robb'd at that place and time by another.

You ſay, many other perſons offered to give proof

proof of the ſame thing; but you thought it unneceſſary.

Pardon me, Sir; this ſeems a great error, or a mere flouriſh: in a matter ſo diſputed, I ſhould have thought no proof unneceſſary.

You tell us, in ſpite of all this, *Canning*'s friends were ſtill * *pleaſed* to doubt. Sir, this is a very ſerious matter, and you promiſed to deliver yourſelf with plainneſs. The expreſſion is unbecoming, and unfair: what you have to ſay, ſpeak! no inſinuations!

I ſuppoſe they ſtill *did* doubt; and that they did it, not becauſe they *pleaſed* to doubt, but becauſe it appeared to them that they had reaſon.

While twenty people *offer'd* to you their evidence, that the Gipſey came long after to the place; twice twenty *gave* them their evidence, that ſhe was there at the time of the robbery. *This* was their reaſon for doubting. I uſe your expreſſion.

Fortunatus (*Fortune natus* I think you ſpell it) ſwears, that he lay in the room; and therefore *you* believe him.

Elizabeth Canning ſwears, ſhe was confined in the room; and therefore *they* believe her.

This is the ſtate of the caſe: mark the partiality of your reaſoning.

You condemn them for believing a ſingle fact upon oath, while yourſelf alſo believe a ſingle fact upon oath: Why are they blameable in

* Addreſs, Page 15.

this,

this, and you commendable? but your own heart approves you: their's, Sir, approves them. The reaſon is parallel.

You purſue this point; and you ſhall give me leave to uſe the ſame method of arguing. If it is of force with you, it is of force with me alſo.

If Natus *and his Wife did not lie in this room*, you ſay, *where did they lay? the contrary has never appeared* *.

I anſwer,

If *Elizabeth Canning* did not lie in this room, where did ſhe lie? the contrary has never appeared.

The words are the ſame, changing the names of the perſons: if therefore it be an argument for one, it is an argument for the other.

I ſhall not proſecute this manner of enquiry, for it might look like petulance, which I deſpiſe: but your arguments in general may be uſed for *Canning*, as well as for the other. I have known men who never argued on one ſide of a cauſe, but they proved the other. The world is happy when ſuch men ſet out in the wrong.

That I may not ſeem to aſſert without reaſon, let me ſtate the next ſentence.

If Ezra Whiffin, you ſay, *was not in the room upon the 18th of January, or did not ſee Judith Natus there, what ſhould induce him to ſwear it?*

* Addreſs, Page 15.

I ſuppoſe I do not miſtake the ſenſe of this paſſage. I take it you mean, the man could have no reaſon for ſwearing *but becauſe it was true*; therefore IT IS TRUE.

This I take to be your argument: if it be any other, inform me.

I anſwer,

If Mary Squires was not at Enfield-waſh before the time when your witneſſes ſwear that ſhe came thither, What ſhould induce their witneſſes, who are of equal credit at leaſt with Ezra Whiffin, and with Fortune Natus, to ſwear ſhe was?

Theſe perſons could have no reaſon for ſwearing ſhe was there at the time, but that it was true; therefore it is true, becauſe they ſwore it.

I might go on with you, Sir, but it is not neceſſary.

If you aſk me whether they or the others ſwore the truth, I do not know; nor, Sir, do you. It is a dreadful thing when oaths oppoſe one another.

I urge this as a proof that men may ſwear what is not true, without having any inducement at all to ſwear it. They may ſwear it thro' miſtake: the want of inducement is no proof. That is all I argue in this matter.

To attack the abſent, is as diſingenuous as to attack the dead. You fall heavily upon Mr. *Fielding*. This uſeful magiſtrate is in another

ther kingdom, endeavouring, perhaps vainly, to recover that health, which he had ſacrificed to application in his country's ſervice.

This is a circumſtance, Sir, that ſhould have made him ſacred from all ſlander.

But we will examine the charge. You inſinuate, that he was wrong in preferring the account given by *Canning*, to that offered by *Virtue Hall* and *Judith Natus*.

You give as the reaſon for this inſinuation, that * *you cannot comprehend why he did it.*

Sir, thoſe who know that gentleman's knowledge and underſtanding, will be convinced that he might have reaſons, tho' *another* magiſtrate could not comprehend them.

Your not knowing why Mr. *Fielding* acted in ſuch a manner, will never be received as a proof that he acted without cauſe. I am ſorry for more reaſons than this, which is of little ſignificance, that he is not here to anſwer.

You boaſt, that the greateſt and the wiſeſt perſon † in theſe kingdoms (I am not worthy to repeat his title) approved of your proceedings.

Sir, I, who queſtion your *Addreſs*, do not deny that I approve of your *proceedings*: your enemies will allow, that, *ſuppoſing you have declared your heart*, any man muſt approve your proceedings to whom you gave the love of juſtice as your *real* motive.

After the proofs you had taken of the Gipſey's innocence, your humanity, you ſay,

* Addreſs, Page 15. † Ibid. Page 18.

could *no longer* plead for *Canning*. The friends of *Canning* would be glad to know, Sir, when your humanity did plead for her.

Nay I, who am perfectly impartial, and ſeek only truth, would be glad to know when that was. I ſee no proof of it in all your own account of your conduct: and as law ſuppoſes all innocent till convicted; humanity ought to allow the ſame.

We have gone thro' your conduct thus far, Sir, hand in hand together; and we will, in the ſame open, free and impartial way, go thro' the reſt.

It becomes honeſt men to act thus. It behoves a Lord Mayor of *London* ſo to act, that his conduct will bear the ſtricteſt ſcrutiny: and when he has appeal'd to the publick, it becomes that publick to judge with candour, and to ſpeak with freedom.

I hope I have ſo judg'd, and ſo ſpoken: I would ſhew myſelf what I am, of no party: the friend of no-body but the honeſt, of nothing but juſtice.

We now come, as you rightly ſay, to the great queſtion that reſpects your conduct, and I hope we ſhall examine it with impartiality.

When you had, by following the ſteps pointed out by upright and diſcerning men, prov'd to the world the innocence of the Gipſey; when you had, by adding the authority of your office, carry'd into execution what they propos'd;

propos'd; and had ſo repreſented the proof of that woman's innocence, that ſhe obtain'd a free pardon; the queſtion is, whether you ſhou'd, or ſhou'd not have proceeded farther.

The words are ambiguous; let us ſtate the queſtion plainly. When you had ſav'd the Gipſey, ſhould you, or ſhould you not, have proſecuted *Canning*.

This is a very material point. You make it a queſtion, whether you ſhou'd or you ſhou'd not have proceeded.

Permit me to anſwer that queſtion, and ſay, *You ſhould not*.

You ſeem to confound two things very diſtinct. The innocence of the Gipſey, and the guilt of *Canning*. They are not neceſſarily connected: that the Gipſey did not rob *Canning*, is no proof that *Canning* was not robbed.

This I aſſert, and this is the true way of reaſoning upon important matters.

Suppoſing the Gipſey to have been prov'd innocent: might it not be *poſſible*, that ſhe, who was thus treated, might miſtake the perſon? and if this was *poſſible*, cou'd it be proper that ſhe ſhould be engaged in ſo unequal a combat, as the ſupporting herſelf in a miſtake, againſt the authority of a Lord Mayor of *London*.

We ſay, 'tis better ten guilty eſcape, than one innocent be puniſhed: there never was a caſe in which the rule ought to have had more weight againſt a proſecution.

Thus

Thus much, Sir, for the matter of juſtice: now let us conſider it with reſpect to humanity.

I wou'd view it in this light, becauſe you ſay humanity was a great motive. I hope what you have alledg'd as your motives, were your *real* motives, and I will endeavour to reconcile your conduct to them, or to ſhew where it differs.

Humanity taught you to ſuppoſe the Gipſey innocent, even againſt her ſentence; becauſe ſome perſons ſwore what *ſeem'd* to clear her.

Humanity ought to have taught you to ſuppoſe *Canning* innocent, for there were leſs oppoſitions, and *as many* ſwore in her favour.

A girl of fair character had as much title to your compaſſion, as a woman of an infamous denomination. Why was it not extended to her?

Shall we ſay, becauſe it was not, that you had ſome *other motive*, altho' you name humanity?

We will ſuppoſe the Gipſey to have been wrongfully accus'd: ſhe was condemn'd, we will ſay, upon miſtaken evidence. You ſav'd her from the ſentence; in that you vindicated the honour of the laws. Why was you to go farther?

Was you, who had juſt reſcued a perſon, becauſe ſhe appear'd innocent to you, and many others; to attempt the puniſhment of one, who appear'd, and who appears yet, innocent to as many!

My

My opinion is poſitive, that you ſhould not have proceeded. You had ſav'd the innocent, ſuppoſing it ſo: you had prevented the abuſe of laws and juſtice; and you had done enough to deter others from ſuch attempts. Was not this ſufficient!

Reaſons there might be for proceeding farther, but humanity was not one of them. Humanity diſclaims the practice.

You ſay, *in this you will ſubmit to the opinions of your conſtituents* *; in that declaration you are right; but, Sir, why ſhould they need YOU "*to guide their judgments?*"

It has been indeed your practice throughout the Addreſs: but ſure it was not prudent in this manner *to avow* it. The words eſcap'd the pen: you could not mean them. To guide men's judgments is to influence them: you wiſh'd, you ſay, to be judg'd with impartiality.

You ſay, *Canning was guilty in the ſame degree in which the other was innocent:* the phraſe is nonſenſe, but that I ſhall excuſe you: I aſk upon what authority you pronounce ſhe was guilty at all.

Should you bring her to juſtice, you ſay, or ſhould you let her eſcape unpuniſh'd? unleſs aſſur'd of her guilt, I think you ſhould have let her eſcape unpuniſh'd. Of her guilt you cou'd not be aſſur'd: and therefore you ſhould have let her go.

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* Addreſs, Page 18.

I may

I may err, but I do not think it proper any more for a magiſtrate to engage himſelf in a proſecution, than to take fees.

No one, you affirm, *will ſay the detection of ſuch an impoſture is not of the* LAST *conſequence to publick ſecurity* *. I ſhall anſwer you, that it is not of the FIRST conſequence: it is enough, that the impoſture had not its effect. The pardon of the Gipſey was ſufficient to ſhew the condition of the publick ſecurity.

I do not allow that the *difficulty* of a proſecution made it the more neceſſary to ſet one on foot: I do not ſee that there was any *danger* in it: nor do I know that any ſuch *faction* as you name was formed. Men of candour and integrity deny it.

Sir, let me add, that in the following paragraph you are too free with private characters. You ſpeak of thoſe who were at the head of that faction. The world will underſtand whom you mean by that expreſſion; becauſe it is no ſecret who were the girl's principal friends. You might as well have called them by their names: nay, having *named* her principal friends, I think you have called them by their names already.

You ſay, theſe men "believed the girl an "impoſtreſs, and yet protected her."

It is incumbent upon you, Sir, to prove this. The reflection is a very heavy one. To protect an impoſtreſs, againſt a man's own

* Addreſs, Page 18.

conſcience,

conſcience, in the ſcheme of an impoſture, is to be guilty of that impoſture.

It is to deſerve whips, pillories, and tranſportation: See, Sir, of what you accuſe theſe perſons: remember that they are men of character; and that it becomes you, nay, it is neceſſary that you retract your words; or prove them.

You ſay, *they thus diſingenuouſly protected her, in oppoſition to you* *.

It ill becomes you alſo to ſay this, unleſs you can prove it true; and as I believe it not to be ſo; I believe that proof impoſſible.

Your office, I agree, was of great importance at that time; but if they oppoſed that, they oppoſed the Mayoralty of *London*, not Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*.

If you ſuppoſe you have any other importance, you miſtake yourſelf as much in that as in the ſuppoſed oppoſition.

Sir, let me aſk you one plain queſtion: *that* will prove whether or not they believed the girl an impoſtreſs, and ſupported her from this imagined oppoſition.

Were theſe men ever your enemies before? or did they become ſo upon your conduct in this matter? I beg this may be anſwered fairly: it will determine all. I think I could anſwer it for you.

If they were your enemies before, they might oppoſe you for that reaſon; but if they were not your enemies before, it is more like-

* Addreſs, Page 18.

ly they oppoſed you from a belief of the girl's innocence; and that your charge is unſupported.

You ſay, your heart told you, that *what you did, your duty and your ſtation required.* What you did in ſaving the Gipſey, believing her to be innocent, they both doubtleſs did require of you.

What you did againſt *Canning*, even tho' you believed her guilty, I think they did not.

I am ſuſpicious of thoſe who accuſe others of diſingenuity.

You ſay, every man owes to the publick his example. It is a noble ſentiment, and you have given to the publick a noble inſtance that you believed it.

Had you ſtop'd here, you ſay, *What would have become of the enquiry* *? what ſhould, would have become of it. What that was, the world will tell you.

But, in your uſual way, as ſoon as you have aſk'd the queſtion, you anſwer it. You tell us what wou'd have become of it: and you tell another ſtory.

Publick juſtice, you ſay, wou'd have been but half vindicated. I think it would have been vindicated entirely; for the accus'd had been excus'd from the ſentence. That expected popularity, which he who ſav'd her perhaps had in his eye, wou'd have been indeed but half effected: nor has it fared better by the farther meaſures.

* Addreſs, Page 19.

Guilt,

Guilt, you ſay, had not been at all puniſh'd: firſt know, Sir, that it was guilt: for at this time (I follow the courſe of your pamphlet) you cou'd only gueſs it.

You add, that *you muſt have remain'd under an inſuperable load of obloquy, for having ſo far done your duty, becauſe you had not done the whole of your duty* *.

Sir, if I underſtand you rightly, there never was a greater miſtake than this.

You ſay, at leaſt ſo it appears to me, that you ſhould have been preſſed with this inſuperable load of obloquy, if after you had ſav'd the Gipſey, you had not proſecuted *Canning*.

Who are the perſons that lay this load upon you? the friends of *Canning*. Would they have laid it upon you for not proſecuting *Canning?* No certainly. They blame you becauſe you did proſecute, and do, as they think, perſecute her; for they apprehend this Addreſs an act of perſecution.

Would they have cenſured you for not doing this? Impoſſible. With what head is it poſſible you can conceive ſuch perfect contradictions?

You tax theſe perſons heavily, Sir, when you ſay they protected *Canning* without any regard to law, decency, or their own characters. I hope you will ſay in which of their actions all this has been inferr'd. I do not ſee it.

* Addreſs, Page 19.

You ſay, that they proſecuted the three countrymen, *knowing them to be innocent* *. Your words are very expreſs. You ſay they, THEN, knew them to be innocent. I hope you are able to prove this.

You ſpeak of the inſuperable load of obloquy under which you was then laid; I am ſure you have laid them under a very heavy one, but I hope not inſuperable. Upon my word I am not one of them; but I think it very incumbent on you to prove all this.

If they did know them to be innocent when they proſecuted them for perjury, they are wicked in the deepeſt degree; and they ought to be render'd infamous.

If you can prove this, do it! and make the world deſpiſe them: if not, I ſhall not ſay what that world will, or what it ought to think of you.

I am of neither intereſt; but I ſpeak as one of that publick to whom you have appealed; and I deliver to you what I ſuppoſe their ſentiments.

You ſay, the pardon of the convict was ſtrongly oppos'd: By whom, Sir, was it oppos'd? her guilt and *Canning*'s were both uncertain, tho' you believ'd the one, and they ſuppos'd the other.

If any oppos'd her pardon, they were as cruel to her, as you have been to *Canning* in the proſecution.

* Addreſs, Page 20.

You

You have ſaid it: but 'tis proper you be call'd to juſtify what you have ſaid: and believe me, Sir, there are many who think, and I am one of them, that this Addreſs is a part of your conduct which needs juſtification, much more than any other which is pretends to juſtify.

If the pardon of the Gipſey was oppos'd, ſpeak out, Sir, and ſay what was the oppoſition. To whom was application made, and what was that application?

So much proof appear'd at that time of the Gipſey's innocence, that I ſhall preſume thoſe inhuman and unjuſt who oppos'd her pardon: let the publick therefore know who theſe were, and what was the oppoſition: if not, we ſhall ſuppoſe there was not any.

This ſuppoſition, Sir, will be very injurious to you; therefore it is your duty to remove it.

If we queſtion the truth of one aſſertion in your Addreſs, we ſhall queſtion all: and what are they to determine of your conduct, who judge you have not related it fairly?

That circumſtantial information of *Naſh*, *Hague*, and *Aldridge*, you ſay, was offered you much ſooner than its date declares it to have been taken.

Sir, the information is of weight. Why was is not taken when it was offered? I muſt confeſs,

confeſs, there appears to me in this place a ſhuffle in the account.

All diſguiſe is unworthy him who has been a Lord Mayor of *London*, giving an account of his conduct to his conſtituents: let the thing be ſtated fairly.

The time when it was taken occaſions conjecture. If it was offered ſooner, let us know why it was not taken ſooner. If it was not ſo offered, why ſhould you ſay it was?

Beware, Sir, in your anſwers to theſe demands; for anſwers you muſt publiſh to them; and I warn you, means are taken to eſtabliſh and prove the truth.

Theſe *Gentlemen* were at firſt friends to the girl; you aſk, *What induced them to be ſo* *? They afterwards changed ſides; you aſk, *What was the occaſion?* Is it of the Livery of *London*, Sir, you aſk theſe queſtions? propoſe them to the men themſelves.

They may have had inducements on either ſide, unknown to you, or to us. As to their characters being above malice; I am ignorant, for I know no one of them: nor their title to the peculiar appellation of Gentlemen.

Is it true, that one of the Gentlemen is ſo humble as to keep a coffee-houſe?

You are full of the importance of the Exciſeman's evidence. But let me be heard upon the ſubject. In the mean time, underſtand me rightly, Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*, I am not queſ-

* Addreſs, Page 21.

tioning

tioning the innocence of the Gipſey, but your reaſons for aſſerting it.

The Exciſeman confirmed what the witneſſes had ſaid of her being at *Abbotſbury*. 'Tis true, and great weight was added to the ſide you took by it. Yet perhaps all you would infer is not to be granted.

How could this man, you ſay, *confirm all that had been ſaid; but that it all was true* *?

He might have confirm'd it all, though it were all falſe, becauſe he might have heard it all.

This you uſe as an argument againſt *Virtue Hall*'s information, becauſe it agreed with *Canning*'s. It is of as much weight in this caſe as the other.

You accuſe Mr. *Fielding* perſonally of eſpouſing *Canning*, knowing the Gipſey to be innocent. He is abſent: but it would become your candour to uſe the ſame freedom with thoſe who are at hand.

Why ſingle out an abſent perſon by name, and only hint at others? an abſent perſon cannot anſwer.

Of this particular matter I know nothing: but I think if Mr. *Fielding* were here to defend himſelf, he would ſet your addreſs in as foul a light, as your Orator ſtands in, under the hands of *Veritas* †.

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* Addreſs, Page 23. † See *Daily Gazetteer*.

Becauſe

Becauſe the attorney employ'd by *Canning's* friends had duplicates of ſome oaths in favour of the Gipſey's innocence; you accuſe thoſe perſons of knowing that ſhe was innocent.

Sir, this is unfair. Are you ſure that attorney communicated thoſe unfavourable papers to them? or if you were ſure of it, would you ſay there had not been one perjury in the caſe of *Canning?*

If others, why not theſe? at leaſt, why ſhould they be above ſuſpicion.

The truth is, a ſingle circumſtance often is enough to give *you* proof; but you will not permit *them* to receive conviction from a thouſand.

What but the force of truth, you ſay, *could produce ſo much unſought for evidence* *?

I have promiſed to anſwer all your queſtions: the *force of perjury*.

The friends and patrons of *Canning*, Sir, had alſo unſought-for evidence. What produced that? If nothing but the force of truth could produce ſuch evidence; then theirs was alſo true.

There is not an argument you uſe, but ſerves their purpoſe as well as your own.

In defending the innocence of *Squires*, you have proved the innocence of *Canning*.

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* Addreſs, Page 26.

then

A good magiſtrate, Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*, may be a miſerable Reaſoner. Both theſe things are not true, though your arguments equally prove both. Are you aware of the concluſion? Your arguments then prove neither. To what purpoſe have you written?

Upon the foot of ſuch evidence, that is, upon the foot of your evidence, what part, you demand of us, ſhould the friends of *Canning* have taken?

I anſwer with the ſame queſtion.

Upon the foot of ſuch evidence, that is, of the evidence they received, what part ſhould they have taken?

You tell us, the part they did take; for you ſay, they protected the girl, and continued to proſecute the countrymen. You would have them determined as to what part they ſhould take by the evidence: and, according to your argument, that was the part they did.

You ſay, *they thirſted for the convict's blood* *. 'Tis a ſevere expreſſion: if not true, I ſhall not add what ſhould be ſaid of it; or of you who ſpeak it.

Did they? The Queſtion is very plain, and to them very important. Did they thirſt after the convict's blood, or did they not?

If they did, how came you to know it. Their actions ſpeak only a defence of *Canning*:

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* Addreſs, Page 26.

Did they tell you this, Sir? if they did, you may affirm it after them.

Judge of your own heart, Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*; but not of that of any other perſon.

You are happy, if we allow you to have ſpoken truth of your own: you can have no knowledge of another's.

You triumph moſt victoriouſly in your twenty-eighth page over a poor word *therefore:* but let us enquire with what reaſon.

That very word is to prove theſe perſons guilty of a malicious proſecution of the three countrymen. Becauſe upon your continuing to proſecute *Canning*, they were adviſed to continue proſecuting theſe men, and have ſaid, they *therefore* were adviſed to it: this is to be a proof they believed; this is to convince us they knew them to be innocent.

Is there not one word in your Addreſs, Sir, that is careleſly inſerted? is there not one word that might be accuſed of betraying the cauſe it was employ'd to defend? Whole ſentences: and I have ſhewn them to you. But we take no ſuch advantages.

We'll give you all your argument. It was *therefore* they proſecuted the men, becauſe you proſecuted *Canning*. We will allow it: this does not prove that they knew them to be innocent.

Though

Though they ſuppoſed them guilty, they might have let them eſcape, if you had not proſecuted her: for all men are not ſuch heroes in the cauſe of juſtice. But when you proſecuted her, it became them to uſe all poſſible means to prove her innocence: and this they thought one of the means in their power.

I ſuppoſe them ſincere: but I am not of their council. This is an account of what might have been their motives, and I pretend to nothing more.

This overthrows your *therefore* argument: and it joins with all the reſt in ſhewing you to yourſelf, as the worſt reaſoner that ever wrote. Shall I accuſe you farther? but no matter. I think as honourably of your heart, as I think meanly of *their heads* who put together this *pitiful* vindication of your conduct.

As to the law buſineſs, of the removing the mens trials into another court, I neither pretend to underſtand it, nor think it worth mine or the publick's notice: only this I ſhall obſerve, the load ſeems to gall you, by the pains you take to throw it off your ſhoulders.

For the farther ſtep of obtaining the *Certiorari's* *, as you call them, unfairly; I think ſomething ſhould be clear'd up on that ſubject.

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* Addreſs, Page 29

You accuſe the friends of *Canning* of very baſe and very diſingenuous practices. I ſuppoſe, if they were aſk'd, they wou'd not allow this to be true.

I obſerve, that no man living has ſo good a hand at making uſes of the dead. You ſay, the Lord Chief Juſtice who ſign'd the *Fiats*, declar'd often he did not do it *knowingly*.

It is a material queſtion: the dead cannot anſwer it; but let us ſee if we can have no aſſiſtance from the living. You ſay, there are thoſe living who have heard him often ſay ſo. Sir, let us know *one* of theſe, and hear him but ſay, that he heard that great perſon only *once* of the often make this important declaration; and we will believe it.

If not —— but I ſhall not take up your manner, and tell people what they ought to think about the aſſertion.

You are very eloquent upon the abſence of the girl. — Is it wonderful that ſhe dreaded ſuch an enemy? what were all her friends to a Lord Mayor of *London!*

You enlarge upon the methods taken to procure her appearance! but what reaſon is there for all this rhetoric and oratory! her conduct may be accounted for with great eaſe and propriety.

She kept out of the way till it was quite neceſſary ſhe ſhould appear: and when that was, ſhe made her appearance.

You

You call the compariſon between her conduct and that of the three countrymen, a compariſon between the conduct of *guilt* and *innocence*.

Change the phraſe, and ſee how it will ſtand upon a new footing. Call it the difference between a perſon ſupported by a few inconſiderable perſons; and that of three others protected by the Lord Mayor of *London*; and ſee whether that way it will not appear as natural. Where people may be innocent, and their conduct does not ſpeak them otherwiſe, who ſhall call them guilty upon its miſconſtruction!

If the office of Lord Mayor were not enough to intimidate them into this; the perſon of Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne* was; and who will wonder at the terror it produc'd.

You ſet out with communicating every ſtep you took to the friends of *Canning:* you acted honourably and impartially. But did you continue to the end this conduct?

You confeſs in your thirty-ſecond page that you did not: and, conſcious of the neceſſity of that confeſſion, you attempt to palliate your alter'd conduct with the reaſons.

Sir, let me once again try you by your own arguments. *What was once right*, you ſay, *is always right*. Therefore having once proſecuted *Canning*, you cou'd not avoid to proſecute her.

Your

Your open conduct in this matter, was at leaſt as right as your proſecution. Why then was it not always right, when it had been once right?

Other mens faults, ſuppoſing they had ſuch as you deſcribe, had no right to get the better of your virtues. You will find it impoſſible to vindicate this proceeding.

You wonder'd that *George Squires* could not remember the places at which he and his mother had quarter'd in their way from *Abbotſbury* to *London:* you were ſurpriz'd that he could not remember the names of above two or three of them.

O Sir *Criſp!* what muſt have been your aſtoniſhment, when he was queſtion'd concerning his rout to *Abbotſbury?* he could not in that remember a ſingle one *.

To you his ignorance ſtood as a proof of his innocence: there were ſome, Sir, who drew a different concluſion from it at the time of the trial.

Upon the whole, if you ſhould demand of me, whether I think *Canning* guilty of wilful perjury, or not; I ſhould anſwer, that I do not know.

I know the reſpect that is due to the determination of a Court of Juſtice. I do not ſpeak as influenced by that, but delivering my own naked thoughts, I am doubtful.

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* Mr. *Biddulph*'s account of Canning's Tryal.

As

As to thoſe perſons who protected her, the queſtion, with reſpect to their characters, is not whether ſhe were innocent; but whether *they thought her ſo.*

They are many of them perſons of ſuch reputable and eſtabliſh'd characters, that I no more doubt but they thought her innocent, than that you determin'd ſhe was guilty much too ſoon. Was not *Canning* in your breaſt, as you ſay *Squires* was with ſome others, condemn'd, as it were, before ſhe was brought to a trial?

If you aſk me what I think of the part you acted? I tell you, as I ſaid in the beginning, that I think it, tho' laudable in the whole, not unexceptionable in all its parts.

I think you to be, and no one knows you better, an honeſt man; but I think, nay I know, you have too much oſtentation.

You have acted the part of a good magiſtrate: but you are too fond of the glory that attends the character.

Have you not been told, virtue is its own reward? be contented with that recompence.

You have convinced all who were impartial: but not thoſe who had been miſled before. Be ſatisfied with the praiſe of informing the reaſon, and do not claim the glory of having got the better of the paſſions.

You

You will be reſpected by the wiſe and the virtuous: but do not give ſo much teſtimony of the reſpect you have for yourſelf.

All men allow you to have acted as a diſcerning magiſtrate; with ſpirit, and impartiality. Is not this praiſe enough? Or what enemy have you ſo great as you are to yourſelf? Why would you drown all this under a torrent of vanity.

Would you had been content with mens good opinion, without courting their praiſe: Even I, who condemn your Addreſs, do not condemn your conduct. What pity that the thing itſelf ſhould be ſo much better than its vindication.

I ſet out with freedom, and I will not drop the familiarity. I'll tell you what I think of you upon the whole; and confeſs, that, if I judge rightly, as you have claimed more merit than belongs to you in the diſcovery: you would, (this is my opinion) boaſt more of the proſecution of it than is fitting.

You would be proud to ſay that you vindicated the honour of the City of *London*, at the expence of your own fortune.

You would be proud to ſay for life, you had laid the City of *London* under an Obligation.

I do not think it proper this ſhould; nor do I believe it likely that it will happen. I

ſuppoſe

ſuppoſe the City of *London* able to diſcharge its own offices, and I ſuppoſe it above obligations to any private perſon.

I would be free in my praiſe, where you appear to me to deſerve it; as I am in my juſt cenſure. I deſpiſe all pretences and diſguiſe: would your Addreſs had ſhewn you of the ſame character.

You will ſay, all men have their faults; indeed with all your virtues you have yours, and they are groſs ones. But I have, to do you juſtice, rambled from my purpoſe. I am writing a Reply to your Addreſs, not a panegyrick, or a ſatyr.

You affirm many, who appeared for the girl, to have been guilty of perjury. 'Tis a home charge, it becomes you to retract, or make it good. 'Tis not time for you to reſt, till you have done all the juſtice in your power; and in delivering the cenſure thus at large, you accuſe the innocent.

In this, you are too raſh: in many places you are to be praiſed for your moderation; and why ſhould not a ſpirit, ſo much to your honour, have been carried thro' entirely!

Why am I throughout, in the ſame breath to praiſe and to condemn you?

You conclude with your moſt important article, the diſcovery where *Canning* was during the month of her pretended abſence.

It is indeed important: it was worthy to be conſidered after all: and mankind were told, you would ſhew it clearly. Perhaps you think you have proved it. I am of opinion you have done nothing towards ſuch a proof. I was diſpleaſed with many parts of your performance; but in this I was altogether diſappointed.

Is this the event of all your earneſt reſearches? Is this the mighty diſcovery we were ſo long promiſed? permit me to tell you, Sir, you have diſcovered nothing.

Whether the girl was or was not at *Enfield*, has been determined upon other conſiderations: but let me ſay, ſhe may very well have been at *Enfield* all the time, for any thing you ſay to the contrary.

Three things you propoſe to clear up: *where ſhe was, under whoſe direction*, and *what was the cauſe of her abſence* *.

Have you ſhewn all theſe? No. Have you ſhewn any one of them? Certainly no. Would it not have been better never to have propoſed them?

You ſay ſhe ſigned her informations with her mark, tho' ſhe was able to write. If this be true, pray which of the three points does it diſcover? it has nothing to do with any one of them.

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* Addreſs, Page 41.

If it were as you repreſent, it might lead one to ſuſpect ſhe was an impoſtreſs; but it points out no part of the impoſture.

Upon the firſt of *February* you allow her weakneſs might excuſe her ſetting her mark, inſtead of writing her name; but you ſay, that cauſe could not hold to the ſeventh.

True Sir: but remember what yourſelf tell us; and bluſh for the unfair inference you draw from it.

You ſay, ſhe carry'd to Mr. *Fielding*, on the ſeventh, an information ready ſign'd: you do not pretend to ſay that ſhe ſigned it on that day. It might be ſigned with her mark while ſhe was unable to write.

Now what becomes of this mighty argument, there is great weakneſs in it, or great diſingenuity. I do not pretend to determine which.

Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne* is, on other occaſions, very ready to tell us the dictates of his own heart. Let him ſpeak them here.

The degree of dirt on her ſhift is a circumſtance too uncertain to mention. Who ſhall ſay exactly how dirty linnen muſt be in ſuch wearing. For the reſt you have a fair account; and you can have no right to doubt the truth of it.

The mother of *Canning* has a right to be believed, till ſome one can accuſe her of impoſture.

You ſay, ſhe and her daughter muſt have contrived the affidavits and the advertiſements at firſt, becauſe they agreed in the naming *Biſhopgate-ſtreet*.

Sir *Criſp*, might they not agree by their ſpeaking of them afterwards?

I allow the daughter ought not to have ſworn to *Biſhopgate-ſtreet*, becauſe the mother had nam'd it in an advertiſement, unleſs it were true, that ſhe knew ſhe was carried thro' it.

But this was a circumſtance that could hurt no perſon: and the girl might wiſh to give authority to what her mother publiſhed.

Your ſuſpicions about the ſtory of the conjurer *, permit me to tell you, Sir, are as raſh, as the irony is aukward, in which they are delivered.

A fooliſh woman might go to a conjurer; and a conjurer, upon hearing her ſtory, might gueſs that ſome bawd had got her daughter.

There is no miracle in this at all: and give me leave to ſay, it would have become Sir *Criſp Gaſcoigne*, addreſſing himſelf to the Livery of *London*, in all places to have been ſerious.

Theſe Sir, are your arguments, and theſe are *all* your arguments, to prove that *Canning*,

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* Addreſs, Page 44.

during

during her pretended abſence, was under the direction of her mother.

They prove nothing.

The circumſtance was not neceſſary for you to meddle with: but ſome infatuation ſeems to have hung over you, throughout this whole pompous and ridiculous Addreſs.

Speak candidly; What would you at this moment give, that no officious agent, or fooliſh friend, had prompted you to make it?

FINIS.

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